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One more contribution to the long debate over
constitutional interpretation calls for some justification. This
Article tackles a specific problem of interpretation in Australian
constitutional law, although it is a problem that will arise in
regard to the interpretation of any document which must be read
and applied over a long period of time. The Article seeks to
bring the concepts of contemporary philosophy of language to
bear upon the problem with the aim of delineating what we
mean by "meaning." The problem chosen to explore the issues
just described is the long recognised difficulty in applying terms
in the Constitution to entities or activities that did not exist at the
time the Constitution was drafted or passed into law. Difficulties
of this sort for constitutional interpretation may be arising more
often as the time when the document was written recedes and
the volume of social change since its inception increases.
It will be argued that a solution to this problem of
constitutional interpretation involves abandoning attempts to
ascertain the meaning of the document as the sole means of
using the Constitution. It will be further argued that a practice of
constitutional interpretation that is restricted to ascertaining the
meaning of the Constitution will be practicably unworkable.
Finally, it will be argued that a practice of interpretation not
* Based upon an article previously published by the author under the title JS Mill, Gottlob
Frege, and the High Court: The Connotation/Denotation Distinction in Constitutional
Interpretation, 23 Australian Bar Rev. 296 (2003).
** Christopher Birch SC BA LLB PhD is a barrister practising at the Sydney Bar and
lecturer in legal philosophy of the University of Sydney.
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based upon ascertaining meaning requires a justification quite
different from one restricted solely to meaning. What is
presently lacking is a justification of such practice. This Article
will not seek to offer such a justification, but it will suggest
some conditions that any such justification would need to
satisfy.
A classic example of the interpretational problem described
above, although one that proved relatively easy of solution, was
posed by The King v. Brislan; ex parte Williams,' in which it
was held that the words in section 51(v) of the Constitution
2
conferring power upon the Commonwealth to make laws with
respect to "postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other like
services" extended to radio broadcasting, even though such
technology did not exist in the 1890s. The words "other like
services" at the end of the provision, and the knowledge that
already existed in the 1890s regarding the electro-magnetic
spectrum made the finding rationally supportable.3
Other issues prove less tractable. Laws of the
Commonwealth to implement treaties protecting the
environment have been held to be laws with respect to external
affairs,4 a result that might have surprised at least some of the
constitutional founders. By contrast, the High Court confirmed
in Eastman v. The Queen5 that the meaning of the word
"appeal" in section 73 was to be construed in accordance with
I. (1935) 54 C.L.R. 262 (Austl.).
2. Australia is governed by a Federal system in which there are six States and a central
government referred to in the Constitution as the Commonwealth. The Federal system was
formed after campaigns in the late 19th Century to federate the original British colonies
and provide them with independence. The campaign culminated in the adoption of the
Australian Constitution in 1901 following a plebiscite held in each of the colonies. The
Constitution is a written document of some 128 sections. Although in setting up a Federal
structure it shares some similarities with the American Constitution the system of
government provided for under the Constitution is a Westminster-style government.
3. Justice Dixon nevertheless expressed doubt that broadcasting was a like service
merely because of its use of similar mechanical or electromagnetic technology and thought
services like telegraphy or telephony were like if they were means for transmitting
messages from one person to another rather than broadcasting at large. Ironically, applying
that meaning to the words, radio and television broadcasting would not be like services, but
email presumably would. See The King v. Brislan; ex parte Williams (1935) 54 C.L.R. 262,
289-90 (Austl.) (Dixon, J., dissenting).
4. Commonwealth v. Tasmania (the Tasmanian Dam Case) (1983) 158 C.L.R. I
(Austl.).
5. (2000) 203 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
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historical usage, which would not have carried the implication
that fresh evidence could be admitted.6
Many more examples can be recited of instances in which
social change has placed pressure upon the way in which one
interprets provisions of the Constitution. Some of these have
been before the High Court; others no doubt will be litigated in
years to come. At Federation the word "marriage" undoubtedly
meant a relationship between a man and a woman. The time fast
approaches when the term may, at least amongst a substantial
portion of the population, be used to describe certain
relationships between people of the same sex. An issue will arise
as to whether Commonwealth powers under section 51 (xxi) of
the Constitution in regard to marriage, extend to making laws
for such same-sex relationships.
Similar issues have arisen concerning challenges to the
Commonwealth's power to legislate in regard to computing
technology and rights in regard to genes and plant varieties.
Scholars suggest that these rights are sui generis.7  These
arguments amount to the assertion that computing technology or
genetic discoveries are not in truth copyright subjects or
patentable inventions as those concepts were originally
understood in section 51 (xviii) of the Constitution.'
Numerous further examples could be generated, in which
entities or activities are said to be capable of regulation under
Commonwealth laws, in turn said to be authorised by provisions
of the Constitution, which were written at a time when the
activities or entities did not exist.
6. Id. at 49 (opinion of McHugh, J.); but see id. at 85 (Kirby, J., dissenting) ("Even on
the assumption that the content of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is to be decided
by reference to what 'appeals' meant in 1900 (which I would not accept) there are many
indications that it is factually incorrect to suggest, as a universal rule, that the notion of
'appeals' excluded absolutely the reception of new evidence.").
7. Jill McKeogh & Andrew Stewart, Intellectual Property in Australia $ 9.8 (2d ed.,
Butterworths 1997).
8. In Grain Pool of Western Australia v. Commonwealth (2000) 202 C.L.R. 479, the
High Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Plant Variety Rights Act 1987
(Commonwealth) and the Plant Breeders Rights Act 1994 (Commonwealth). It follows
from what is argued below that this should be treated as a non-semantic interpretation of
the Constitution. The same point is made in regard to the Court's conclusion in Nintendo
Co. Ltd. v. Sentronics Systems Proprietary Ltd. (1994) 181 C.L.R. 134, regarding the
Circuit Layouts Act.1909 (Commonwealth).
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One solution to the problems just described, and a solution
frequently relied upon by judges of the High Court of Australia,
has been to note the distinction between the connotation and
denotation of words. Put simply, the connotation of a word is the
sense or meaning of the word, while the denotation is the class
of things identified or picked out by its meaning. Thus, although
the connotation (or meaning, in the narrow sense) may remain
unchanged, the denotation of the term is said to alter over time
as new objects come into existence which are capable of being
identified as members of the denoted class.9
The connotation/denotation distinction was developed
within the field of semantics and logic, although it is little used
in contemporary semantic theory. However, contemporary
semantic theory does make much use of another distinction,
similar in important respects, namely the distinction between the
sense and the reference of words, a distinction first propounded
by the German philosopher Gottlob Frege in 1892 in his paper
Ober Sinn und Bedeutung (usually translated into English as On
Sense and Reference).'°
It is doubtful if Frege's distinction can do the work
demanded by those who wish to maintain that the meaning of
the Constitution may remain unchanged while the reference of
its terms can vary. More recent criticisms of Frege's work make
even more doubtful the possibility of a coherent account of
meaning in which the terms of the Constitution could have a
fixed meaning but a mobile reference."
Contemporary semantic theory offers the judge or lawyer a
difficult choice. If one wishes to maintain that the legal
interpreter is solely concerned with meaning, then one may well
be stuck with a single fixed meaning associated with the
meaning of the words at the time they were uttered. This
approach, however, should not offer much consolation to those
so-called textual originalists such as Justice Scalia of the United
9. See the entry "Connotation and Denotation" by Gim Del Villar in the Oxford
Companion to the High Court of Australia 135 (Tony Blackshield et a]., eds., Oxford U.
Press 2001).
10. Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Reference, in Translations from the Philosophical
Writings of Gottlob Frege 56 (Peter Geach & Max Black, eds., Blackwell 1977).
I1. An example of such recent criticism is found in Michael Beaney, Frege, Making
Sense 257ff. (Duckworth 1996). For further references to commentary on Frege's notions
of sense and reference, see note 33, infra.
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States Supreme Court, since it will be argued that consistent
with such an approach, the Constitution will have a narrow
meaning in regard to substantial numbers of major legal
controversies in contemporary times. It might even be said that
the Constitution has no meaning in regard to these contemporary
legal controversies. A purist would suggest that the Constitution
means what it says and cannot therefore be accurately described
as having no meaning. Nevertheless, the point is that these are
controversies which are, by their nature, matters upon which the
Constitution and its drafters have never spoken, and therefore,
which have never been dealt with. In that sense, and in regard to
these issues, the Constitution has no meaning.
The consequence, it will be argued, is that the process of
constitutional interpretation must for practical reasons eschew a
concern solely with the meaning of the document strictly
understood. However, once the process of judicial decision
making on constitutional cases is severed from the meaning of
the Constitution, a new problem arises, namely, how or in what
principled fashion can judges be constrained by the
constitutional text. No theory presently on offer solves this
problem.
CONNOTATION/DENOTATION
The connotation/denotation concept was explained by
Justice Windeyer in The Queen v. Commonwealth Conciliation
& Arbitration Commission; ex parte Professional Engineers
Association" in the following terms:
We must not, in interpreting the Constitution, restrict the
denotation of its terms to the things they denoted in 1900.
The denotation of words becomes enlarged as new things
falling within their connotations come into existence or
become known. But in the interpretation of the Constitution
the connotation or connotations of its words should remain
constant. We are not to give words a meaning different
from any meaning they could have borne in 1900. Law is to
be accommodated to changing facts. It is not to be changed
as language changes. 3
12. (1959) 107 C.L.R. 208 (Austl.).
13. Id. at 26 7.
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The use of this distinction in constitutional interpretation
was also explained by Justice Dawson in Street v. Queensland
Bar Association.14 His Honour there said:
I speak of 1900, the time of Federation, because it is in
accordance with the meaning given at that time that the
limits of the phrase "trade and commerce" must be
ascertained. The essential meaning of the Constitution must
remain the same, although with the passage of time its
words must be applied to situations which were not
envisaged at federation. Expressed in the technical
language of the logician, the words have a fixed
connotation but their denotation may vary from time to
time. That is to say, the attributes which the words signify
will not vary, but as time passes new and different things
may be seen to possess those attributes sufficiently to
justify the application of the words to them."
His Honour thereafter traced the technical use of the terms back
to John Stuart Mill's A System of Logic and usefully collects the
High Court decisions since 1908 that have relied upon the
distinction.
In Re Wakim; ex parte McNally, 6 Justice McHugh accepted
the distinction, noting its similarity to the distinction drawn by
Ronald Dworkin between "concepts," being the abstract notions
expressed in the Constitution, and their application to present
day "conceptions." His Honour said:
Indeed, many words and phrases of the Constitution are
expressed at such a level of generality that the most
sensible conclusion to be drawn from their use in a
Constitution is that the makers of the Constitution intended
that they should apply to whatever facts and circumstances
succeeding generations thought they covered."
Professor Leslie Zines has suggested that the distinction
relied upon b , the High Court is a now "outdated philosophical
distinction," bringing a riposte from Justice McHugh 9 and
Justice Kirby.2°
14. (1989) 168 C.L.R. 461 (Austl.).
15. Id. at 537 (opinion of Dawson, J.).
16. (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511 (Austl.).
17. Id. at 552.
18. Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution 17 (4th ed., Butterworths 1997).
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The distinction continues to do work for members of the
High Court. In Re Patterson; ex parte Taylor,2' those members
of the Court who sought to deal with the constitutional power of
the Commonwealth to make laws in regard to aliens pursuant to
section 51(xix) of the Constitution had to grapple with the
difficulty that in contemporary immigration law, an alien was
thought to be anyone who was not a citizen of the
Commonwealth. At the time the Constitution was drafted,
citizenship was not an important legal concept, and anyone who
was a British subject (even though born in Britain and without
any other connection to Australia) would not have been
considered an alien. The Court in Patterson overruled its
previous decision in Nolan v. Minister of State for
Immigration." Members of the majority again concluded that
while it was not possible for Parliament to alter the meaning of
the word "alien" as it appeared in the Constitution,
circumstances may bring it about that the class of people now
denoted as aliens by that term could be quite different from
those denoted as aliens in 1900.23
In Patterson, Justice McHugh further noted how in Sue v.
Hill4 the Court had held that the term "foreign power" in
section 44(i) of the Constitution now includes the United
Kingdom, although in 1901 and for long after, the United
Kingdom was not a foreign power within the meaning of that
term.25
19. See Re Wakim, 198 C.L.R. at 552:
Philosophers are now said to regard the distinction between connotation and
denotation as outdated .... But whether criticism of the distinction is or is not
valid should not be seen as decisive. What is decisive is that, with perhaps only
two exceptions, the Court has never hesitated to apply particular words and
phrases to facts and circumstances that were or may have been outside the
contemplation of the makers of the Constitution .... [O]nce we have identified
the concepts, express and implied, that the makers of our Constitution intended
to apply, we can give effect to the present day conceptions of those concepts.
20. See Eastman, 203 C.L.R. at 80 (speaking of the interpretation of constitutional
language according to present-day meaning, Justice Kirby contested the "distinction
between the connotation and denotation of verbal meaning").
21. (2001) 207 C.L.R. 391 (Austl.).
22. (1988) 165 C.L.R. 178 (Austl.).
23. See Patterson, 207 C.L.R. at 410 1 44 (opinion of Gaudron, J.) & 426 108
(opinion of McHugh, J.).
24. (1999) 199 C.L.R. 462 (Austl.).
25. Patterson, 207 C.L.R. at 427 T 110.
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JOHN STUART MILL'S SEMANTIC THEORY
In A System of Logic,26 Mill said:
Connotative names have hence been also called
denominative, because the subject which they denote is
denominated by, or receives a name from, the attribute
which they connote. Snow, and other objects, receive the
name "white", because they possess the attribute which is
called "whiteness"; Peter, James and others receive the
name "man" because they possess the attributes which are
considered to constitute humanity. The attribute, or
attributes, may therefore be said to denominate those
27objects, or to give them a common name.
Mill acknowledged Archbishop Whately for having drawn
attention to this distinction in his Elements of Logic,2' a work by
which Whately had revived the study of formal logic in England
after some two centuries of neglect.29 However, the term "to
connote" was first used by Mill's father, James Mill, although in
the sense conveyed by John Stuart Mill's term "denotation." 3 o
By contrast with connotative names, the younger Mill
referred to proper names, which denote only the individuals
called by the name and do not indicate or apply any attributes as
belonging to those individuals.
Finally, Mill recognised a category of connotative names
given to individuals because the name signifies attributes, but
only one individual possesses the attribute. Mill gives the
example of "God" when used by a monotheist. On the other
hand, a general name denotes that class containing the indefinite
multitude of individuals so named.
Clearly, general names can refer to objects which do not
exist at the time of an utterance. A general name will connote
certain attributes which will then in turn denote all those
subjects possessing the relevant attribute." Thus the word
"person" used today (or used in 1900) may denote the class of
26. John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Longmans, Green
& Co. 1898) (first published 1843).
27. Id. at 20.
28. Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (J. Mawman 1826).
29. John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy 21 (Penguin Books 1968).
30. Mill, supra n. 26, at 25.
31. /d. ch. 2. k 7.
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all beings belonging to the species homo sapiens, whether they
existed in the past, present, or future, if that be the relevant
meaning of the word in the utterance.
But it can be seen immediately that if the word "person"
was used in the 1900s in the general sense to refer to all persons,
past, present, and future, or to at least some category of persons
which would include future persons, it denoted those persons
who would come into existence in the twenty-first century, and
it denoted those people existing in 1900 at the time the word was
uttered. The denotation of the word "person" does not change
with the coming into existence of each new object which may be
described by the general name "person." Mill's concept simply
does not permit the denotation of a general name to change
while the connotation remains the same. Indeed how could it,
since it is the connotation of a term which fixes its denotation?
How does a name or word come to connote some particular
attribute or class of attributes by which the objects denoted may
be ascertained? Mill's theory of connotation was not a complete
attempt to explain how words have meaning, and treating
meanings of general terms as a list of attributes might these days
be thought an inadequate explanation of meaning and a
replacement of one mystery by another.
Since at least the publication of Grice's seminal article
Meaning,32 philosophical analyses of the problem of meaning
have recognised the importance of intention to an explanation of
meaning. Grice's project, which remains controversial, was to
demonstrate that the primary notion of meaning was explicable
in terms of the intentions of an utterer to induce in the audience
certain states of belief. Grice's explanation went on to show that
the notion of meaning required that the utterer intended the
belief to be induced by his or her communication, and the
audience to recognise that it was the utterer's communication
that was to cause them to have the belief.33
Grice's concept emphasised that meanings are essentially
mental or psychological entities, but at the same time, language
is a shared social practice, and dictionary or literal meaning (or
32. H.P. Grice, Meaning, 66 Phil. Rev. 377 (1957).
33. H.P. Grice's theory is further developed in Utterers' Meaning and Intention, 78
Phil. Rev. 147 (1969) and Meaning Revisited, in Mutual Knowledge (N.V. Smith, ed.,
Academic Press 1982).
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what lawyers currently call textual meaning) is the mental state
typically associated with, or shared by, speakers of a language,
not the idiosyncratic mental state of some individual speaker.
Although proponents of truth-conditional semantics have
sought to offer in opposition to Grice's view an analysis derived
from the philosophy of logic, equating the meaning of a
statement with the conditions that would render the statement
true, at least some proponents of this view still recognise that for
an utterance to be a meaningful utterance, it must be an
intentional utterance.34
It is not necessary that every object referred to by a word be
within the contemplation of the utterer as part of its meaning.
Further, there will undoubtedly be inferences capable of being
drawn from the meaning of terms, at least logical inferences,
that will not have been within the contemplation of utterers.35
However, the meaning of any particular text or utterance will
still be based upon the shared intentions and practices of the
community of language users from which the text or utterance
arose. Applying these concepts back to Mill's theory, it is those
shared intentions and practices that dictate the attributes
connoted by a word.
Clearly it is quite consistent with Mill's terminology that a
general name used in the Constitution in 1900 might denote
something that was not then in existence; this will be because
the meaning of the term as used in the Constitution in 1900
extended to that whole class of objects which includes the
present object in issue. Thus, if the attributes connoted by the
term "copyright" as used in the Constitution in section 51(xviii)
in 1900 were of sufficient generality to encompass computer
34. Mark de Bretton Platts, Ways of Meaning 92 (2d ed., MIT Press 1997). Truth-
conditional semantics was first devised by Donald Davidson. The critical essays are
collected in Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford U. Press
1984). The current preference for semantic theory to rely upon the psychological states of
speakers is not only the preference of the author, see the entry by Tim Crane, Meaning, in
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy 542 (Ted Honderich, ed., Oxford U. Press 1995).
35. Further there is the point made by Professor Goldsworthy that general terms by
their nature are such that the objects which fall under them at one time may not fall under
them at another time. Hence, the phrase "legal tender" in 1965 included pounds, shillings
and pence but not in 1967. Plainly, however this is still governed by the connotation of the
term, which in turn is governed in the fashion described above. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy,
Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 Fed. L. Rev. 1, 42 (1997) (publication of
the Australian National University).
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programs, then computer programs are denoted by that term.
The non-existence of computing technology in 1900 is not a
reason in itself to conclude that the term could not have denoted
computer programs, any more than the fact that I did not exist in
1900 is a reason to find that denotation of the term "person" in
the Constitution does not denote me.
But it is now plain that the connotation/denotation
distinction offers little assistance in answering the question,
whether in 1900 the term "copyright" could be applied to,
amongst numerous other subjects, computer programs.
However, when we now put the question in those terms, it
obviously seems far less likely that in fact it did. To use Mill's
term, the "attributes" connoted by the word "copyright" in
1900 will have been determined by the shared understandings
and intentions of competent users of the word at that time. The
list of attributes that any competent speaker of English in 1900
would have used to enumerate the characteristics of a work in
regard to which copyright might be claimed would not have
extended to computing technology. Still more telling arguments
could be developed, in regard to plant variety rights or genetic
discoveries, for example, as subjects of Commonwealth
legislative power.
Returning to our central problem, if we attribute one
particular meaning to the Constitution in 1900 and we wish to
continue applying that meaning (indeed we may doubt whether
there can be any other meaning), how do we apply the terms of
the Constitution to facts and circumstances not foreseen or
imagined at the time that the document was written? There may
well be terms of the sort referred to by Justice McHugh in
Wakim36 couched at such a level of generality that they can be
said to have meant or denoted objects of a type never envisaged
in 1900. Trade and commerce, even on the meaning possessed
by those terms in 1900, plainly denoted contracts to buy and sell
computers, television sets, and other such goods never dreamt of
at the turn of the century. On the other hand, where the term
denotes a bundle of attributes (to use Mill's language) which had
a commonly accepted meaning connoting those attributes in
1900, it is a far more difficult question to determine whether the
36. See Wakim, 198 C.L.R. at 552 $ 44.
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term could also mean a different, albeit a similar or related
bundle of attributes, denoting objects of a sort that did not exist
in 1900.
FREGE AND THE CONCEPTS OF SENSE AND REFERENCE
Gottlob Frege relied upon a distinction very similar to
Mill's connotation/denotation distinction in the development of
his semantic theories. The importance of Frege's work to
modem logic and semantics leaves no room to suggest his
distinctions are philosophically outdated. His work provides the
best chance of making good, in some revised form, the
connotation/denotation concept.
One of Frege's principal concerns was to determine why
identity statements in regard to proper names were necessarily
true. Using Frege's famous example, it is true that the morning
star is the evening star (both are the planet Venus). If, however,
one imagines the truth of the identity statement to be a
consequence of the object referred to by each phrase being the
same, a paradox arises. We cannot substitute one phrase for the
other in all possible applications and still preserve the truth of
the resultant proposition. Thus, while the sentence "the evening
star is the morning star" is true, it is not necessarily true that
"John believes that the evening star is the morning star" (he
may mistakenly believe them to be different planets).
3 7
For Frege, that one could not substitute the phrases
"morning star" and "evening star" in all contexts while
preserving truth was explained by words having both sense as
well as reference. Thus evening star and morning star have the
same reference; they both designate the planet Venus. On the
other hand, they have a different sense. Frege's explanation of
the concept of sense is illusive, something like mode of
presentation of reference, or way of thinking of something.
Frege's theory was largely elaborated in regard to problems
associated with the semantics of proper names. Much of Frege's
important work on this subject was published posthumously, and
it has been a source of philosophical controversy as to whether
the concepts of sense and reference can be applied to general
37. See Frege, supra n. 10.
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concept words as opposed to proper names, although some
contemporary philosophers have argued that it is capable of such
application.38
Frege's theory provides no avenue for justifying a theory of
interpretation which would permit the meaning of terms to
remain fixed while the range of objects to which they refer
varies. One cannot treat Frege's concepts of sense and reference
as referring to meaning on the one hand, and the actual objects
denoted by a meaningful expression on the other. Rather, Frege
considered sense and reference were both aspects of the
meaning of an expression. To each sense there will be a
reference; however, the very point of the distinction is that
although a single reference may be associated with a number of
senses (the Reverend Dobson, Lewis Carroll, the author of Alice
in Wonderland are three separate senses all associated with the
one reference). It will offer no assistance in solving the
problems of constitutional interpretation associated with new
and unforeseen activities. Frege's theory will not permit a single
meaning to have a changing or evolving reference.
MEANING AND SCRIPT
Another way of seeking to resolve the problems caused by
social and technological change also needs to be examined and
rejected. In recognising that meanings are tied up with the
shared intentions and practices of a community of language
users at some particular time, it follows that the meaning of a
text does not change even if a script for that text may be read
and given a meaning other than that given to it by the
community by which it was written. Language tokens such as
writing or the sounds made by human vocal chords during
speech are ways of representing meaning but are not themselves
38. Key developments from Frege's work were Bertrand Russell's theory that proper
names are definite descriptions, explained in his essay On Denoting, in Logic and
Knowledge, Essays of Bertrand Russell 39 (Robert Charles Marsh, ed., George Allen &
Unwin Ltd. 1956). On the other hand, Saul Kripke rejected the Fregean approach to proper
names in his causal theory of reference. See Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity
(Blackwell Publishers 1972). Michael Beaney, see supra n. 11, notes the attempts to apply
Frege's theory to concept words and functional expressions and further notes that
posthumously published papers of Frege suggested he likewise intended it to apply.
However, Frege's work has remained underdeveloped in this application.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
meanings. Thus, the quite different scripts "dog" and "hund"
are respectively the English and German signs that mean "dog."
The process by which common words of English acquire
new meanings is familiar3". However, it would be misleading to
suggest that meanings have changed; rather, the signs or
symbols of the English language have altered in the meanings
they now represent. Words such as "gay" or "cool" may now
be used to represent the meanings of homosexual or fashionable,
but these were meanings always understood by English
speakers; what in truth has happened is that we can now
represent these meanings with different symbols. To put it this
way is not to deny that the symbols with which meanings are
represented may bring their own resonance to words, so that
"gay" and "homosexual" may not enjoy perfect synonymity.
In the case of a text written or drafted over 100 years ago,
such as the Constitution of Australia, it would be surprising if
there had not been at least some drift so that the symbols that
constitute the text no longer represent the same meanings in
modem English that they represented in Australian English of
the late nineteenth century. This drift is unlikely to have
occurred in any coherent and principled fashion. One should not
expect, if one reads the text of the Australian Constitution as a
text of modem Australian English, that it would read as a
coherent and consistent body of constitutional rules. The drift or
slippage between meanings, and the signs in English used to
represent them does not bring about some automatic updating of
the Constitution; rather, it is part of the noise or static which
impedes our properly understanding the meanings to be
conveyed by the text.n°
The problem posed by the drift which causes the symbols
of the language to represent different meanings with the passage
39. In this sentence, the reference to "words" is made to them as signs or symbols, not
the concepts or meanings represented by those signs or symbols
40. Surprisingly, it has been suggested in some cases that statutes should be interpreted
in accordance with the current meaning that would be attributed to their terms even if that
would not be the meaning they had when they were enacted. This method even has a label,
the "always speaking approach." See D.C. Pearce & R.S. Geddes, Statutory Interpretation
in Australia 93ff (5th ed., Butterworths 2001), discussed infra n. 43. Although Pearce and
Geddes suggest this approach shows "obvious good sense," it is difficult to see why the
new or altered meaning picked up by the terms used in a statute as a result of linguistic
drift should be given effect. It is hard to imagine a justification of the always speaking
approach that would satisfy the principles discussed in the last section of this Article.
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of time is more chronic than may be imagined. Once it is
recognised that words do not have an evolving or mobile
denotation or reference, permitting them to gather up new
activities different in kind from those originally described, then
it must be understood that those new activities were not
subsumed by the meaning of the word in the original text, but
rather, the language symbol (or word) which represents the old
meaning has now come to represent a meaning encompassing
the old activity and the new activity. This is no more or less than
the language symbol now representing a new and expanded
meaning. The process by which the symbols of our language
gather and shed meaning, and whether new meanings are added
to existing symbols or acquire new symbols of their own, is no
doubt a complex social process, but not one related to a
consistent reinterpretation of the Constitution that would track
some group of coherent and rational legal principles.
It was pointed out at the beginning of this Article that many
of the terms used in a statute or a constitution will refer to or
denote matters or objects that did not exist at the time the text
was created. The individual facts could not have been in the
contemplation of the drafters. It was pointed out that in many
instances this will not be a problem. Statutes are couched in
general language and usually apply to all people or things
coming into existence, including those born or created long after
the Act was passed.
The reference in the Constitution to trade and commerce is
properly and sensibly read as including contracts to buy and sell
computers, spaceships, television sets, and microwave ovens,
none of which existed and most of which were beyond the
comprehension of the drafters of the Constitution. Nevertheless,
there still needs to be a link with the beliefs and intentions of
speakers of English in 1900 if these matters are to be resolved
semantically rather than by reference to some interpretative rule
which no longer depends upon meaning.
LEGAL INTERPRETATION AND SEMANTIC THEORY
Ambiguity, uncertainty, or meaninglessness may be
resolved in normal dialogue, whether oral or written, by
reformulations and restatements until the recipient is satisfied
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
that he or she has understood what is being conveyed. What
distinguishes problems of interpretation in law from so many
other uses of language is that the very purpose for which the
document or text was created prevents restatement or
recapitulation. Whether a legal problem concerns a contract,
deed, or other private instrument, or a statute, constitution, or
international instrument, the document exists because people
have bound themselves to have their legal rights and
entitlements determined in the future by reference to an
authoritative document. The document is appealed to just
because one party does not wish the other to now seek to restate
or reformulate what was originally communicated. The
document is relied upon as the bulwark against one or another
party resiling from a promise, agreement, or compact or seeking
to now restate a version of some earlier agreement in a fashion
calculated to give advantage.
These functions of legal texts also generate the often
described difficulties where drafters must use general terms, yet
seek to deal with whole categories of future occurrence, and
where it is impossible to foresee all types of future occurrence or
comprehend all of the implications that may be inferred from the
language used in the document.
Despite these difficulties, it might still be thought that the
only way an authoritative document can be used to resolve a
legal dispute is to search for the relevant meaning of the
document applicable to the dispute and apply that meaning.
Many lawyers and legal philosophers treat the search for the
meaning of an authoritative legal text as the sole means by
which it can operate as a dispute solver. To the extent that there
appear to be different modes of interpretation, it is sought to
subsume these under the concept of meaning or to search within
the competing theories of meaning for that one which represents
the appropriate way of decoding the text.4'
It is of course theoretically possible for texts to operate in
many other ways. To be fanciful for a moment, but to help drive
the point home, let me suggest that a text might operate along
with an authoritative tribunal where the tribunal is obliged to
41. See e.g. Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory 28ff (Oxford U. Press
1992), (suggesting that interpretation is a search for meaning, although acknowledging the
different senses of meaning).
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read the text and to take it into account in resolving the dispute,
but would not be expected to use it only by seeking to apply
sentences of it in accordance with their meaning directly to the
circumstances of the dispute. Such use of a document would be
analogous to that which might be made by a religious adherent
for whom a sacred text may be applied by being read as a source
of inspiration but without the suggestion that it can be applied to
the solution of some religious or moral dilemma by subsuming
the problem or dispute under the terms of the text.
This use of texts where they are applied, not by seeking to
read them as rules or instructions applicable directly to the
circumstances of the dispute, I shall refer to as a non-semantic
use of the text. This may perhaps be an unfortunate label since
any use of the text will depend upon it having a meaning. What,
however, is emphasised, is that the use will not be a direct
application of the meaning of the text.
One can imagine ways in which an authoritative legal text
is used to resolve disputes without applying its meaning in the
conventional sense, for example, by using a recognised decision
procedure whenever it lacks a meaning or has ambiguous
meanings. Thus, if we apply the decision rule that in the case of
any ambiguity or uncertainty in interpretation of a document we
shall adopt that interpretation which will produce the best
consequences, all things considered (an act-utilitarian decision
rule),42 then although we could describe the interpretation of the
document arrived at in this fashion as a meaning of the
document, our interpretation has not been arrived at by any
semantic rule. We have not resolved the ambiguity by finding
the meaning most probably intended by its author, or that
meaning which would most probably be adopted by a skilled
speaker of the document's language. From a semantic
perspective there may be something arbitrary about such an
interpretation; however, its virtue lies in its utility maximising
consequences, not in its consistency with the rules of language
or grammar.
Once rules of construction are looked on in this light, it can
be seen that many rules of legal construction may be concerned
42. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 135 (2d ed., Clarendon Press 1994), and Neil
MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory 129ff (Clarendon Press 1978), who both
suggest the use of such a rule in limited circumstances.
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with elucidating meaning, but not necessarily all. Some decision
rules such as ejusdem generis might be thought to represent
presumptions about meaning to be applied in cases of
uncertainty or ambiguity.43 On the other hand, a presumption of
the sort that common law rights or liberties will not be revoked
or interfered with without express words may be considered a
presumption as regards meaning (the legislature must have
intended not to interfere with such rights or it would have used
express words), or it may be treated as a substantive rule
protective of rights and liberties." This latter justification of the
rule would be supported on the basis that it is a protection of
rights, which ought only to be abrogated by clear words.
For many jurists, the legislative task in construing a statute
is giving effect to the legislative will as expressed through the
words by which the legislature has formally spoken. From this
perspective, the process of statutory construction is always and
only an exercise in ascertaining the meaning which the
legislature has expressed. This will be the case whether one
concerns oneself with the actual intentions of those who
promoted the bill that underlies the statute in question, or
whether one considers that the legislative intention is to be
ascertained objectively, or in other words, whether one views
meaning as determined by the intentions of speakers or by the
45rules governing ordinary usage.
Justice Scalia, a key proponent of textual originalism,
recognises that, consistently with his view that the meaning of
the United States Constitution is determined by the practices of
language use governing English at the time the Constitution was
written, there is therefore no room for rules of interpretation in
ascertaining the meaning of the text:
43. Pearce & Geddes, supra n. 40, at 103.
44. Id. at 131ff.
45. See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the
Authority of Intentions, in Law and Interpretation 357, 360ff (Andrei Marmor, ed.,
Clarendon Press 1995), for the view that legal texts are attempts by authorities to
communicate their determinations of what ought to be done, and the compendious list of
those jurists holding this view, id. at 361 n. 11; see also Antonin Scalia, A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 37ff (Princeton U. Press 1997), for the view,
expressed by one of its leading exponents, that the meaning of a statute or constitution is
the original meaning of the document ascertained objectively, namely, by the usages of
competent speakers of the language at the time it was written.
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Can we really just decree that we will interpret the laws
that Congress passes to mean less or more than what they
fairly say? I doubt it.
46
The central importance of ascertaining the meaning of the
text, and scepticism or disapproval of principles of construction
that may involve departure from meaning, no doubt reflect the
theory of legislation that views it as an expression of the will of
the legislature, and views the legislature as having authority to
exercise its will by virtue of the democratic sources of its
political power. 4' Even in the case of a constitution, for which no
people alive have voted, its authority might still be seen to
derive from its adoption through a constitutional plebiscite and
from the fact that the electors at large, when properly
constituted, retain the power to amend or appeal it and have not
seen fit to do So.48
Any attempt to consistently apply the principle that the text
of a constitution or statute shall be determined by looking to the
actual intentions of the drafters or legislators, however, has
proven impossible to sustain in light of difficulties in knowing
which individual's intentions are relevant, and because in regard
to many legal problems, no individual in the lawmaking process
held an actual intention on the issue that has arisen. Recourse to
the hypothetical intention, or the intention the individual
lawmakers would have had, had they considered the issue,
proves more problematic than a straightforward appeal to the
41ordinary canons of language use.
It is often because of the anomalies and difficulties of
seeking to give effect to the actual intentions of the drafters or
legislators that appeal is made to the principles of textualism. °
46. Scalia, supra n. 45, at 29.
47. Alexander, supra n. 45, at 361.
48. G.J. Lindell; Why is Australia's Constitution Binding?-The Reasons in 1900 and
Now, and the Effect of Independence, 16 Fed. L. Rev. 29 (1986).
49. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 325 (Fontana 1986); Michael Stokes,
Constitutional Commitments Not Original Intentions: Interpretation in the Freedom of
Speech Cases, 16 Sydney L. Rev. 250 (1994); David Lyons, Original Intent and Legal
Interpretation, 24 Australian J. Leg. Phil. 1 (1999).
50. 1 shall use textualism as a label for the interpretative principle that a text should be
read in accordance with its meaning ascertained from the linguistic customs and practices
of the speakers of the language in which the text was written at the time in which it was
written. I understand this to be what Scalia means by textualism. For a recent statement of
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In Gricean terms, textual meaning is often referred to as
dictionary meaning or literal meaning, in contrast to speakers'
meaning. Jurists who embrace textualism as the appropriate way
to ascertain the meaning of a legal document need not abandon
semantic theories that stress intentionality as an essential
ingredient of meaning. As argued above, Grice saw dictionary or
literal meaning as capable of being explicated in terms of
speakers' meaning.
For a Court asked to apply the terms of a contract, justice
and fairness dictate that the meaning of the terms be ascertained
by reference to dictionary or literal meaning in the Gricean
sense, it being fairer to hold a party to what the other side, to a
reasonable observer of the bargain, would be thought to have
agreed to, rather than to poorly expressed subjective intentions.
However, even this principle may be displaced if the contracting
party was aware that the other did not understand the words in
their usual sense and sought to take unconscionable advantage
of the mistake.
I shall proceed on the assumption that some version of
textualism will be the standard theory in most instances of legal
interpretation. Few appellate courts in the common law world
presently espouse speakers' or utterers' intention theories of
interpretation in either contractual, statutory, or constitutional
contexts. A distinction between the two perspectives is
important in those instances where textualism leads one to put
aside an actual intention held by individual lawmakers. In
dealing with problems caused by new social and legal problems
not foreseen at the time a constitution or statute was drafted, the
difference between textualism and the original intention theory
of interpretation becomes less relevant. Those constitutional
framers responsible for drafting the Australian Constitution
probably did not have in mind, when drafting the external-affairs
power, the possibility of international treaties concerned with
environmental protection, or discrimination on the grounds of
race and gender. Individual framers probably did not have an
actual intention that marriage might ever be thought one day to
include same-sex relationships. They certainly did not have an
intention that computing technology would be included or
a textualist view of interpretation from Australia, see Wilson v. Anderson (2002) 190
A.L.R. 313, 316 (Austl.) (opinion of Gleeson, C.J.).
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excluded from the copyright power. However, none of these
problems are resolved by moving from the level of speakers' or
utterers' meaning to textualism.
If one substitutes for the intentions of those who drafted the
Constitution the meanings that would be attributed to the words
of the Constitution by competent English speakers in Australia
in 1900, one is no further advanced in resolving those
interpretative difficulties created by historical and cultural
change since the time the document was drafted. Properly
understood, textualism as a theory of meaning will simply cause
us to substitute for the intentions and beliefs of the actual
constitutional drafters, the intentions and beliefs about words of
competent speakers of English in late nineteenth century
Australia. No doubt the pool of beliefs that might be held about
the meaning of words amongst competent speakers of English in
1900 was more extensive than the actual beliefs of Sir Samuel
Griffith5' or Inglis Clark,52 but nobody in 1900 had any beliefs
about computing technology, and no one used the word
"copyright" in connection with computer programs.
One could seek to escape the dilemma just described by
seeking to attribute a hypothetical intention to a competent
English speaker in 1900. Thus, one might ask whether a normal
English speaker in 1900 would, if presented with an appropriate
package of information about the nature of computers, be
willing to treat computer programs as the sort of thing in regard
to which one could make a copyright claim. However, one of the
attractions of textualism is that it seems to avoid the difficulties
and paradoxes that arise whenever one has to resort to a
hypothetical speaker's intention. Just how does one take a
hypothetical nineteenth-century speaker of English and present
him with an appropriate package of information? What
knowledge would such a hypothetical speaker have to have
attributed to him to provide us with an answer? Does one
51. Sir Samuel Griffith (1845-1920) was one of the principal drafters of the Australian
Constitution and a campaigner for Federation. He became Chief Justice of Queensland in
1893, and in 1903, was appointed the first Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia.
52. Inglis Clark (1848-1907) was a constitutional lawyer and campaigner for
Federation. He prepared an early complete draft for the Constitution for consideration at
the 1891 Constitutional Convention. Clark was strongly influenced by the United States
model, having corresponded with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. His Studies in Australian
Constitutional Law, first published in 1901, has been an influential text.
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assume that the hypothetical speaker of 1900 otherwise brings to
bear upon the problem all the other values and beliefs of an
Australian in 1900? In which case, the answer one derives will
be anachronistic and probably incoherent; any intelligible view
about control of computing technology requires some
knowledge about the function of computers in contemporary life
and their economic and technical operation. On the other hand,
if one attributes to one's 1900 speaker of English the knowledge
and beliefs of a twenty-first century Australian, then firstly, it
makes a mockery of any claim that one is applying the canons of
language use of Australians who lived over one hundred years
ago, and secondly, the exercise is so filled with artificiality and
hypothesis that it is clear in any event that the answer one
arrives at will be dictated by the inferences the Court chooses to
draw and will not be constrained by any historical linguistic
facts.
SEMANTIC ORIGINALISM
Ronald Dworkin has used the phrase "semantic
originalism" to describe the views of jurists such as Justice
Scalia, who maintain that texts such as the United States
Constitution should be read and interpreted in accordance with
the meaning that they had at the time that they were written and
that the meaning must be ascertained by applying the canons of
language use of American English from that time. Dworkin
argues for a more flexible mode of interpretation. He
acknowledges that this approach would involve departure from
speakers' meaning, but in labelling his view "expectation
originalism," he maintains that his view is faithful to what the
constitutional drafters would have expected to occur as
succeeding generations sought to apply the Constitution to new
problems.
3
Dworkin claims to be an originalist, but he separates his
views from textualists, or those he calls semantic originalists, by
53. The distinction is made by Dworkin in his comment in reply to Scalia published in
Scalia's book. See Scalia, supra n. 45, at 119. Dworkin makes a similar point in several
other places. See e.g. Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra n. 49 (chs. 9, 10); Ronald Dworkin,
Life's Dominion 118ff (Harper 1993); Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law (Oxford U. Press
1996) (particularly the Introduction).
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arguing that those abstract terms within the Constitution
(particularly those rights amendments in the United States
Constitution) are terms that need to be interpreted afresh in each
historical epoch to deal with historical changes. Dworkin does
not use a connotation/denotation distinction to show how these
fresh interpretations may be unpacked from the abstract or
general terms of the Constitution. In arguing that the general and
abstract terms of the Constitution are statements of moral
principle which may be interpreted to cover circumstances
unforeseen by the constitutional framers, Dworkin's view is a
non-semantic approach in the sense described above.
The approach of Dworkin, in common with those
Australian jurists who apply a textualist approach to interpreting
the Constitution, is to have the best of both worlds. Purporting
on the one hand to be originalists for whom the interpretation of
the Constitution is said to be grounded in the text created by the
framers, on the other hand they seek to avoid some of the
implications of rigorous semantic originalism. 4 In Australia this
has been done by use of the connotation/denotation distinction,
which may be thought to give room for manoeuvre without
abandoning appeal to original meaning.
Theoretically, there is nothing to prevent semantic
originalism being adopted as the sole canon for interpreting the
Constitution. Such an approach can be properly justified by an
appeal to semantic theory, and it represents a consistent and
intelligible view concerning the interpretation of the
constitutional text. However it is doubtful if such an approach
has ever been, or could be, rigorously adhered to. Once it is
acknowledged that the meanings conveyed by the original
constitutional text are bound up with the shared intentions of the
community of language users that gave rise to the document, it
must be recognised that there is no scope for a changing or
evolving denotation or reference that could leap ahead of those
shared intentions. The meaning of the Constitution is therefore
governed by the knowledge, beliefs, and social values of the
community of language users at the time it was written. Its
54. One of the commonest criticisms of Justice Scalia's semantic originalism is that he
fails to follow it faithfully in his own judicial work. See R Dworkin's comments, in Scalia,
A Matter of Interpretation, supra n. 45, at 120; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin, in
New Republic 26 (May 5, 1997).
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meaning will consequently be narrow, and its terms will not
encompass new social practices and technologies that were
unforeseen at the time it was written.
Apart from the difficulty semantic originalism poses once it
is recognised that there is no way one can continue to adapt the
Constitution to new and unforeseen circumstances without
altering or expanding the meaning of its terms, there is a further
problem, that of knowing or ascertaining what was the original
meaning of the terms.
Because of the problem of linguistic drift, although many
words55 in modern Australian English have meanings which
overlap with the meaning those words connoted in 1900, it is
also likely that many of these terms (for example, trade and
commerce, external affairs) have had their meanings expanded
or displaced. To now simply apply those terms as terms of
modern English would be to abandon semantic originalism. To
be a consistent semantic originalist would require complex and
sophisticated linguistic analysis to determine and trace the
displacement and change of meaning in these terms.
Some might consider the difficulties just described as being
exaggerated, that the level of social change and meaning
displacement is capable of being handled by interpreters and that
the only proper way of updating the Constitution remains the
method of amendment, in accordance with section 128 (if one is
concerned with the Australian Constitution). Some might
criticise the view on broad political grounds, but it could not be
criticised for misunderstanding the nature of language or
meaning. Provided interpreters avowing semantic originalism
are content to bear the burdens that such a theory imposes, it
should be acknowledged that they are striving to apply the
meaning of the Constitution.
NON-SEMANTIC THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION
Not everyone will be prepared to accept the limitations
imposed by semantic originalism. In the United States, Ronald
Dworkin has been perhaps the best known critic of the view, but
55. The term "words" is again now used to indicate the signs or symbols used by
speakers to represent meanings.
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there have been many other jurists who have suggested that the
Constitution may have an evolving interpretation. This Article
will not seek to review the many theories that have been
propounded in justification of a "living constitution," or
changing or evolving interpretation.56 Rather, this Article only
seeks to make the point in regard to these theories, that they are
non-semantic theories in the sense described above. They do not
apply the meaning of the Constitution to the solution of legal
disputes. If they do not apply the meaning of the Constitution to
legal disputes, then if they are to be justified interpretations of
the Constitution, they require an appropriate theory justifying
their non-semantic modes of interpretation.
Hopefully, enough has been already said regarding the
determinative role, in regard to the meaning of words, of the
shared intentions of the community of language users, to now
permit it to be said without further argument that the meaning of
a text cannot simply shift with the passage of history in order to
encompass new and unforeseen circumstances. Dworkin's
theory of expectation originalism disclaims an attempt to apply
the original meaning of the Constitution, but says that the
drafters must themselves have envisaged that a process of
reinterpretation to deal with new and unforeseen circumstances
was inevitable, and provided later interpreters keep faith with
the central and underlying principles of the Constitution, its
revised meanings will be proper interpretations.57
Dworkin criticises the argument that the meaning of the
Constitution can be confined by the intentions of some
presumed set of framers or drafters. Those framers may have
believed that the provisions they drafted about equality and due
process had legal implications in concrete cases different from
those you or I would now draw from a contextual application of
their words, but Dworkin argues that it does not follow they
meant to say anything different from what you or I would have
meant to say if we had used the same words. This argument is
ultimately unworkable. While Dworkin does not wish to
abandon the notions that language is intentional and that the
56. For a contemporary Australian example, see Hon. Justice Michael Kirby,
Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor Worship? 24
Melbourne U. L. Rev. 1, 11 (2000).
57. Dworkin, Freedom's Low, supra n. 53, at 75-76.
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framers' intentions in some fashion must count, they now count
for so little that I can come to a different conclusion from them
despite apparently applying the same words. This will not be an
application of the meaning of the words. This may be merely a
result of linguistic drift, in which case the words in the
Constitution have now acquired a new meaning. Alternatively, it
may be that through a process of interpretation, a new meaning
has been attributed to the words of the Constitution.
Dworkin believes that his theory is strong enough to
demonstrate the existence of an objectively correct answer at
any particular time as to what the Constitution means, albeit it
may mean different things at different times." Stanley Fish has
argued persuasively that Dworkin's theory cannot establish that
the constraints on interpretation are in the text; rather,
interpreters are constrained by the practices and understandings
shared by the community. within which they function.
Dworkinian principles or moral readings of the Constitution
only operate as an external constraint upon the possible
interpretations that may be read into the document to the extent
that one maintains there is an objectively correct public
morality. 9
It has already been argued that one of the principal
purposes of a legal text is to constrain citizens and governments
and create a framework for permissible conduct. However, it is
not just any constraint, or constraint for its own sake, that the
Constitution seeks to lay down, but specific constraints defined
by the meanings contained within the Constitution. Any attempt
to sever the Constitution's effect in later times from the meaning
possessed by the text at the time it was written also severs the
purpose and function served by the Constitution from that which
it had at the time of Federation.
58. Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra n. 49, at 364ff.
59. Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally (Clarendon Press 1989) (particularly
ch. 4, at 99, and chs. 5, 16); see also Stanley Fish, There Is No Such Thing As Free Speech
and It's A Good Thing, Too (Oxford U. Press 1994) (especially chs. 1I, 13). John Rawls,
with his concept of public reason expounded, and Cass Sunstein, with his notion of
untheorised disagreement, highlight the intractability of many moral disagreements and the
importance of judicial decisions being justified without recourse to the global moral views
of the adjudicator. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia U. Press 1996); Cass
Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (Oxford U. Press 1996).
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The significance of this might best be understood by
contemplating the effects of the adoption in Australia of a bill of
rights with similar force to a constitutional provision. Such a bill
could and would only be adopted at the present time because a
substantial portion of the community believes that certain
specific constraints on governmental action and certain legal
effects so far as the rights of citizens are concerned should be
guaranteed or underwritten by an authoritative text. However, no
sooner will such a text be agreed upon and adopted, than the
problems of linguistic drift and unforeseen social change will
start to afflict it. Unless its interpreters all espouse semantic
originalism, the bill of rights will inevitably come to guarantee
or constrain conduct in ways never intended or foreseen by those
who promoted it. This ought not to be seen as necessarily an
argument against adopting such a bill of rights-proponents
might consider this an acceptable price, although given the
uncertainties, a price difficult to measure.
If one is not to be driven back to semantic originalism, then
legal theory needs to propound a basis that can justify an
authoritative tribunal, such as the High Court of Australia,
regularly replacing the meaning attributed to the Constitution
with a fresh meaning. This theory would need to have two
important characteristics. Firstly, it would need to show how at
least ideally, there is a preferred solution. A theory so weak that
it merely invited judges to interpret the document as best they
thought would suit the contingencies of the day would be
tantamount to simply conferring upon High Court judges a
general discretion to resolve governmental and political disputes
in accordance with the dictates of their political and moral
values. A constitution open to reinterpretation in a fashion which
is essentially unconstrained can no longer serve the purpose of a
compact between the arms of government and the citizens of the
State.
No doubt there are possible decision rules for reinterpreting
the Constitution that would produce determinant results. On the
other hand, these rules may be deficient for other reasons. A
decision rule which requires the Constitution to be read as if it
were a text of modern English would produce as determinate a
result as semantic originalism. On the other hand, it would not
produce a consistent and rational reinterpretation of the text.
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Proponents of living constitutions might desire a mode of
interpretation that will permit new constitutional rules to be
fashioned reflecting the solutions a wise and rational legislature
would adopt, but it is a tall order to expect that a theory of
interpretation ,can. perform that function.
The second matter that any adequate theory of
interpretation should provide is a political justification of the
function that will be performed by the authoritative tribunal
vested with the power to construe the Constitution. Doctrines
emphasising the role of courts as declarers of law will be
inadequate for this purpose. An emerging justification for such a
role may be based simply on its inevitability, perhaps coupled
with maxims of restraint and a ukase to decide issues narrowly,
and only if deciding them is unavoidable, thus seeking to
minimise the interpretative task and protect courts against the
accusation that they have seized a role that more properly
belongs with the legislature or with the electors gathered in a
constitutional plebiscite. However, it is not obvious why this
task, once undertaken, should adopt a conservative default rule
rather than any other.
Neither constitutional interpreters nor legal theorists have
devised a theory sufficiently strong to meet the two principal
requirements just described. Constitutional interpretation thus
presently dwells in an uncomfortable zone. Few jurists are
prepared to fully embrace the rigors of semantic originalism,
while they lack a comprehensive justification for alternative
practices. Regrettably, current legal theory does not appear to
have a ready solution to these dilemmas. One possible answer is
the pessimistic one, that no solution to these dilemmas exists.
This could be because we expect of constitutions things they
cannot deliver. If the Constitution is to operate as a constraint
that is determinant and predictable, not open to infinite future
variation with new interpretation, then one will be driven
towards semantic originalism with the difficulties already
highlighted. The removal of those difficulties may not be
reconcilable with the purpose of a constitution, or with the
political theories which seek to justify it and the governmental
and judicial institutions created under it.
